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Background: Calls for disaster medical assistance teams (DMATs) are likely to continue in response to
international disasters. As part of a national survey, this study was designed to evaluate Australian DMAT
experience in relation to the human resources issues associated with deployment.
Methods: Data was collected via an anonymous mailed survey distributed via State and Territory
representatives on the Australian Health Protection Committee, who identified team members associated
with Australian DMAT deployments from the 2004 South East Asian Tsunami disaster.
Results: The response rate for this survey was 50% (59/118). Most personnel had deployed to the Asian
Tsunami affected areas with DMAT members having significant clinical and international experience. While
all except one respondent stated they received a full orientation prior to deployment, only 34% of respondents
(20/59) felt their role was clearly defined pre deployment. Approximately 56% (33/59) felt their actual
role matched their intended role and that their clinical background was well suited to their tasks. Most
respondents were prepared to be available for deployment for 1 month (34%, 20/59). The most common
period of notice needed to deploy was 612 hours for 29% (17/59) followed by 1224 hours for 24% (14/59).
The preferred period of overseas deployment was 1421 days (46%, 27/59) followed by 1 month (25%, 15/59)
and the optimum shift period was felt to be 12 hours by 66% (39/59). The majority felt that there was both
adequate pay (71%, 42/59) and adequate indemnity (66%, 39/59). Almost half (49%, 29/59) stated it was better
to work with people from the same hospital and, while most felt their deployment could be easily covered by
staff from their workplace (56%, 33/59) and caused an inconvenience to their colleagues (51%, 30/59), it was
less likely to interrupt service delivery in their workplace (10%, 6/59) or cause an inconvenience to patients
(9%, 5/59). Deployment was felt to benefit the affected community by nearly all (95%, 56/59) while less (42%,
25/59) felt that there was a benefit for their own local community. Nearly all felt their role was recognised on
return (93%, 55/59) and an identical number (93%, 55/59) enjoyed the experience. All stated they would
volunteer again, with 88% strongly agreeing with this statement.
Conclusions: This study of Australian DMAT members provides significant insights into a number of human
resources issues and should help guide future deployments. The preferred ‘on call’ arrangements, notice to
deploy, period of overseas deployment and shift length are all identified. This extended period of operations
needs to be supported by planning and provision of rest cycles, food, temporary accommodation and rest areas
for staff. The study also suggests that more emphasis should be placed on team selection and clarification of
roles. While the majority felt that there was both adequate pay and adequate indemnity, further work clarifying
this, based on national conditions of service should be, and are, being explored currently by the state based
teams in Australia. Importantly, the deployment was viewed positively by team members who all stated they
would volunteer again, which allows the development of an experienced cohort of team members.
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D
isasters are increasing in frequency, with more
than 10,000 disasters reported in the past 50
years, affecting 12 billion people and resulting in
12 million deaths (1, 2). Some large disasters will over-
whelm the preparedness of any region or country, with
probable calls for disaster medical assistance and huma-
nitarian aid (3, 4). This will require the timely mobilisa-
tion of national and international resources. Disasters
are also more likely to occur in developing countries
(2, 5), where their effects may be more pronounced.
On 26 December 2004, the South East Asian tsunami hit
countries around the Indian Ocean rim, particularly
around its earthquake-associated epicentre off Indonesia.
The full impact of the tsunami is still being assessed
years after the natural disaster, which is thought to have
killed more than 250,000 people and affected millions (6).
The tsunami was also a landmark event in the history
of Australian disaster management, as it was the first
time that organised civilian based teams, described else-
where (7), were deployed under the Australian Assist
Plan (AUSASSISTPLAN) (8). The agencies responsible
for the organisation of DMATs have dual account-
abilities. They need to provide the most effective res-
ponse based on the needs of the affected community,
while also ensuring the welfare, health and safety of
those deployed, whether employees, contract workers or
volunteers. It is, therefore, essential that staff deployed to
provide disaster assistance not only have the appropriate
backgrounds and expertise but human resources issues,
such as deployment period, shift length, remuneration,
insurance and indemnity have been properly addressed.
Much of the literature concerning DMATs, including
the Australian DMAT experience (916), consists of
individual team reports, which are often anecdotal. The
lack of standards for DMATs has also made in-depth
evaluation difficult for both an external reviewer and
team members. Hence, there have been few studies
examining DMAT deployments and few dedicated stu-
dies of DMAT members in Australia. The present survey
was part of a national program evaluating the Australian
DMAT experience and examining potential models for
future use in Australia. The survey was undertaken in
order to target the existing Australian DMAT experience
base and both explore and identify issues raised by these
groups. The experience base primarily includes those
individuals actually deployed ‘on the ground’, and this
aspect of the survey explores the human resources issues
associated with their deployment.
Methods
The methods for this study have been described elsewhere
(7). Briefly, all team members associated with Australian
DMAT deployments from the 2004 South East Asian
Tsunami disaster were surveyed via their State/Territory
jurisdictions. Representatives of the AHPC through their
State and Territory jurisdictions identified 118 DMAT
personnel and mailed out questionnaires on our behalf.
The human resources component of the survey itself con-
stituted 25 questions. This was grouped as two sections
which consisted of four questions in which respondents
were asked to select an option related to time periods of
deployment or shift length (all with opportunity for other
response) and 19 Likert scale responses. There was also
space provided for additional comment in each section.
Data was also collected on demographic details. No
follow-ups were undertaken due to conditions placed on
the study by the ethics approval. Our study protocol was
reviewed and approved by the James Cook University
Human Research Ethics Committee in 2006 (Approval
No. H2464). The support of the Commonwealth Aus-
tralian Health Protection Committee (AHPC) was also
sought and given for the survey. Data was entered into a
spreadsheet program and analysed using the Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences (Version 14.0, SPSS,
2006). Descriptive statistics were used, as the sample was
relatively small.
Results
The overall response rate for this survey was 50%
(59/118). The demographic details of the respondents
have been given elsewhere (7). Survey responses are
described in Table 1.
Approximately 58% (34/59) of those responding
stated they had significant experience in international
disasters before deployment. All except one respondent
stated they received a full orientation prior to deploy-
ment. Despite this only 34% of respondents (20/59)
felt their role was clearly defined pre deployment
although approximately 56% (33/59) felt their actual
role matched their intended role.
While 49% (29/59) stated it was better to work with
people from the same hospital, only 12% (7/59) felt it was
better to work with people from the same state.
The majority felt that there was both adequate pay
(71%, 42/59) and adequate indemnity (66%, 39/59). All
stated they would volunteer again, with 88% strongly
agreeing with this statement.
Most respondents were prepared to be available for
deployment for 1 month (34%, 20/59), once placed
on standby, while equal numbers were prepared to be
available for two weeks (22%, 13/59) or longer than 3
months (22%, 13/59). Seven (12%) were only prepared
to be available for one week and one person for 1 day.
Five preferred unspecified other time periods. The notice
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needed to deploy ranged from less than 6 hours for
22% (13/59) to 3 days for a similar number (22%, 13/59).
The most common period stated was 612 hours by
29% (17/59) followed by 1224 hours for 24% (14/59).
Twenty-seven respondents (46%) stated the optimum
period of overseas deployment to be 1421 days fol-
lowed by 1 month for 15 (25%), 1014 days by eight
(14%) and 710 days by one (2%). Eight respondents
(14%) preferred deployments longer than 1 month.
The optimum shift period was felt to be 12 hours
by 66% (39/59) and 8 hours by 22% (13/59). One
person preferred 24 hour shifts, two preferred unstated
‘other length’ shifts and four did not respond to this
question.
Discussion
This study represented the first national survey of
Australian DMAT members deployed to date. The
experiences of these deployed professionals in relation
to the human resources issues related to their deployment
have been sought and the findings need to be incorpo-
rated as part of future planning and preparedness. This
is particularly relevant as the Australian Government
continues to develop an Australian Medical Assistance
Teams (AUSMAT) program (17), with recent deploy-
ments to Samoa, Pakistan and New Zealand.
This study of the Australian DMAT experience
found that although team composition was varied,
health professional membership was consistent with
that described by other authors (18). The DMAT
members had significant clinical and international ex-
perience, although most had little or no experience in
disaster management.
Clinical background, role and team selection
An essential human resources issue is team selection,
which must be tailored to meet the specific needs of the
affected community (19) and based on a full under-
standing of the type of disaster and expected injury
patterns (2022). Central to this is the clinical back-
ground of team members and roles in deployment. The
importance of team structure (15) and team member
selection (9, 15) has been noted previously in reports of
Australian DMAT activity with team success very much
dependent on the selection of the right person for
a specific job crucial in both normal and emergency
Table 1. Levels of agreement of statements concerning human resources issues
Statement
1
Strongly
disagree
2
Disagree
3
Neither
disagree
or agree
4
Agree
5
Strongly
agree
Not
applicable/
missing
I had significant experience in disaster
management before deployment
15 (25%) 33 (56%) 1 (2%) 3 (5%)  
I had significant experience in international disasters
before deployment
6 (10%) 12 (20%) 6 (10%) 14 (24%) 20 (34%) 
My role was clearly defined pre deployment 14 (24%) 22 (37%) 3 (5%) 11 (19%) 9 (15%) 
My actual role matched my intended role 3 (5%) 15 (25%) 8 14% 21 (36%) 12 (20%) 
My clinical background was well suited to my tasks 3 (5%) 11 (19%) 8 (14%) 20 (34%) 13 (22%) 4 (7%)
I received a full orientation prior to deployment  1 (2%)  19 (32%) 33 (56%) 6 (10%)
It is better to work with people from the same hospital 4 (7%) 16 (27%) 10 (17%) 20 (34%) 9 (15%) 
It is better to work with people from the same State 6 (10%) 17 (29%) 19 (32%) 5 (8%) 2 (3%) 10 (17%)
There was adequate pay 2 (3%) 7 (12%) 6 (10%) 29 (49%) 13 (22%) 2 (3%)
There was adequate indemnity 1 (2%) 4 (7%) 14 (24%) 23 (39%) 16 (27%) 1 (2%)
My deployment was able to be easily covered by staff
from my workplace
 13 (22%) 12 (20%) 25 (42%) 8 (13%) 
My deployment caused an inconvenience to colleagues 4 (7%) 12 (20%) 13 (22%) 26 (44%) 4 (7%) 
My deployment caused an inconvenience to patients 8 (13%) 23 (39%) 10 (17%) 4 (7%) 1 (2%) 12 (20%)
My deployment interrupted the ability to provide a
clinical service in my workplace
7 (12%) 25 (42%) 10 (17%) 2 (3%) 4 (7%) 11 (19%)
My deployment benefited the affected local community  1 (2%) 2 (3%) 23 (39%) 33 (56%) 
My deployment benefited my local community 1 (2%) 4 (7%) 29 (49%) 20 (34%) 5 (8%) 
I enjoyed the experience   4 (7%) 11 (18%) 44 (75%) 
My role in the deployment was recognised on return 1 (2%) 3 (5%)  28 (47%) 27 (46%) 
I would volunteer again    7 (12%) 52 (88%) 
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situations (23). Despite nearly all receiving an orientation
pre-deployment there were concerns expressed in this
study by team members who did not feel their clinical
background was well suited to their tasks, their role was
not clearly defined pre deployment or that their actual
role did not match their intended role. While this may
reflect planning and team selection issues, it should also
be noted that, for early deployments, there was little time
available for full orientation to occur and that needs
change rapidly.
To be effective, teams need to be multidisciplinary, have
the appropriate training, and have predefined strategies
for how to carry out these tasks. While planning should
aim to keep roles as close as possible to the respondents’
usual daily duties (24), those selected should also have as
broad a base of experience and expertise as possible to
increase their value and ability to work in a variety of
situations (25), with flexibility the key. Administrative
staff should also be health professionals who can serve
two or more roles in a deployment (26). There also needs
to be a clear understanding of all team members’ roles
and responsibilities, and how they contribute to the
overall objectives (27). Job identification and responsi-
bility are essential for staff morale, with team cohesive-
ness helping them better withstand prolonged exposure
to the stresses generated by the disaster (28). A review of
the coping mechanisms of health care teams in Thailand
following the tsunami, found those who had volunteered
for teams, were found to be more supportive of other
team members, than those simply asked to work with
teams. This was thought to reflect the contribution of
positive attitude towards motivation and team function.
In this study most respondents had been asked to go
(28). Selection should also not be based entirely on skills;
fitting into a team and being able to carry out the work
required in the field is more desirable (29), reinforcing the
need for pre-deployment screening of both physical and
psychological health (30).
The selection process needs to be rigorous and com-
plete. In the US example, people wishing to become
NDMS team members need to complete a federal ap-
plication, submit to background checks, maintain their
professional credentials, be able to physically perform
their assigned job, and comply with training require-
ments. The social and personal impact of deployment is
considered in even more detail by some organisations
which have found having partners attend an introduction
day where they gain an understanding of the commitment
and dangers may eliminate a number of applicants
(29). Organisations need to be sure that volunteers have
considered the effects of deployment on themselves,
their home life and career; conditions of work in the
field; support and funding; any issues of conscience and
what it will be like returning home (29, 31).
Experience
Unfortunately, the majority of people responding to
international disasters may be novices who volunteer for
short periods then return to their normal occupations
without passing on their experiences (32). The growing
need for disaster relief work and a rapid response has
led many organisations to place inexperienced or inade-
quately trained personnel in the field. Such inexperienced
but enthusiastic workers may be of limited or decreasing
usefulness (33), and may even have a negative impact
as such personnel can threaten the success of a pro-
gram, frustrate beneficiaries and donors, and damage the
credibility of the agency (34). The Tsunami Evaluation
Coalition made note of the lack of career structure in
general for international relief work which encourages
this high staff turnover, general shortage of relevant
expertise and recruitment of inexperienced personnel
(35). The development of future models should seek to
develop and retain the core of experience developed from
previous deployments.
Local and state based teams
The preference in this survey was to work with people
from the same hospital rather than simply with
people from the same state. Reasons for this were not
explored but there are obvious team advantages with
established working relationships. Each US DMAT has a
sponsoring organisation, such as a major medical
centre (18, 31). This means US DMATs may serve two
different functions. They act as a local resource to the
institution sponsoring them, and can also be activated as
a federal reserve (26). There can, however, be problems
with availability if all staff come from one institution.
Even a hospital the size of Massachusetts General has
found constraints with the ability to cover staff deploy-
ment (36, 37), while both staff availability, and ability to
cover their absence, has also been an issue for the US
military (37). Having a regional base for team member-
ship may spread deployment load, help maintain local
service delivery and increase response capability through
a jurisdiction and allow enhanced intra-jurisdictional
response if the primary institution is affected. Ease of
access to ongoing training programs, through geographic
proximity, should still enable relationship and team
building to occur.
Period of availability and notice
Most respondents were prepared to be available for
deployment, once put on notice, for 1 month, which is
consistent with the US DMAT experience (31). Rotating
call periods are essential to cover leave and existing
work commitments. Although local people provide the
first response, there may still be a need to respond quickly
once activated (25), depending on the role of the de-
ployment. Teams need to have a response structure and
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strategy in place that can be activated immediately (38),
which includes all team members having current pass-
ports (25). The notice needed to deploy in this survey
ranged from less than 6 hours to 3 days, with the most
common period required being 624 hours. There are also
inherent delays in activation given the request for aid
must travel through pre-established diplomatic channels
once the affected country has determined that its own
resources have been overwhelmed or destroyed (5, 25).
While this takes time, ‘shortcutting’ this procedure
may have unwanted consequences including perceived
invasion, incarceration of relief staff, and political
repercussions (25). Teams and individuals who respond
to disasters without authority or accreditation will only
add to the problems of the affected country, further
draining their resources (38).
Period of deployment and shift length
Redmond et al. note that, after 5 days on scene, both
mental and physical exhaustion can set in, reducing the
effectiveness of the team and increasing the risk to
patients. A strict rule to disengage after 5 days was
used by their Manchester based team and had to be
accepted by the team before departing (39). In contrast,
the preferred period of deployment in this survey was
1421 days with longer periods of deployment such as
1 month or longer also preferred to shorter periods of
deployment.
This longer deployment period mandates a need for
extended operation planning (40) and development of
measures to minimise both physical and mental fatigue
(41). This includes the provision of rest cycles, short
breaks, food, temporary accommodation and rest areas
for staff as an aid to management of stress and morale
(40). Leisure time activities are also often limited due to
safety concerns, power shortages, curfews, transport
difficulties and the closure of local businesses (42). Rest
breaks may need to be enforced as the temptation is for
off duty staff to ‘hang around’ (18, 27, 41), with rest often
difficult when teams work in 12-hour shifts as preferred
by respondents in this study.
Funding and indemnity
The funding model has a great influence on the scope of
the project (27). Significant expenditure can be antici-
pated and will vary according to the type, extent and
magnitude of the disaster, the number of people sent, the
type and amount of equipment, and the length of time
deployed, while team members also need to have job
security and medico-legal indemnity (25). While most
felt that there was both adequate pay and adequate
indemnity this needs to be predetermined with funding,
insurance and indemnity issues resolved before deploy-
ment, including guidelines on what will be funded
on deployment and policy developed on use of cash
advances and credit card use (16). National conditions of
service would also aid inter operability of state based
teams (15).
The US approach of ‘federalising’ DMAT members for
operational deployment eliminates a number of potential
problems, including licensing issues (18, 31, 43, 44),
liability (31), insurance coverage (43, 33), and wage
guidelines (18). Although training is usually voluntary
(44), they are treated as Federal employees for the
duration of duty, so their expenses are met, and they
are paid or have their normal salaries reimbursed by the
US Public Health Office (31, 45). This also means they
have the protection of the Federal Tort Claims Act,
in which the Federal Government becomes the defendant
in the event of an interstate malpractice claim (31). In
return, DMAT members are required to maintain appro-
priate certification and licensing within their discipline
(31, 45). This option has since been explored by some
state based AUSMAT in Australia, including Western
Australia, which now has position numbers within the
human resource system to enable all AUSMAT members
to become short term state health department employees
to address these issues whilst on deployment.
Deployment was felt to benefit the affected community
by nearly all, while less felt that there was a benefit
for their own local community. This is a reflection of
the direct and tangible benefits provided to the affected
community versus indirect and intangible benefits for the
donor community. Nearly all felt their role was recog-
nised on return, they enjoyed the experience and would
volunteer again. This is important as it aids retention
of an experienced cohort and when supported by an
appropriate policy framework and database assists future
deployment of teams most likely to add value to the
affected region.
This study represented an analysis of data collected
on a cross-sectional survey of Australian DMAT
members. There was a 50% response overall, but a
limited response from some states, particularly New
South Wales and Victoria, suggested coverage concerns.
The inability to undertake follow-ups, due to ethics
limitations, may also have contributed to the poor
response in these jurisdictions. Of the seven teams
deployed, four were mixed state teams and three were
single state teams with four deployed initially and three
up to 1 month later. The five-person team deployed to
Sri Lanka and was most at risk of not being repre-
sented. This is offset to some degree by the overall
response rate, small size of that team, other teams being
deployed in the same response phase, levels of experi-
ence amongst responders and the representative mix of
disciplines. The use of self reported data and the
inherent limitations of this are also acknowledged.
Hence, although generalisation and extrapolation of
this data will therefore be limited, the data can be
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useful in developing a more effective response to
deployment health of members of future DMATs.
Conclusions
This study of Australian DMAT members provides
significant insights into a number of human resources
issues and should help guide future deployments. The
preferred ‘on call’ arrangements were for periods of
1 month while the majority needed between 6 and
24 hours notice to deploy. The preferred period of
overseas deployment was 1421 days with 12-hour shifts.
This extended period of operations needs to be supported
by planning and provision of rest cycles, food, temporary
accommodation and rest areas for staff. While uncer-
tainty is inherent in this style of deployment, the study
also suggests that more emphasis should be placed on
team selection and clarification of roles. Only 34% felt
their role was clearly defined pre-deployment and 24%
felt their clinical background was not well suited to their
tasks. Working with others from the same hospital was
preferred to state, regional or national based teams, and,
although respondents acknowledged the inconvenience
their deployment caused to their colleagues, they did
not feel it interrupted service delivery or inconvenienced
patients. While the majority felt that there was adequate
pay and adequate indemnity, further work clarifying this
based on national conditions of service should be, and
are, being explored currently by the state based teams in
Australia and the Australian Health Protection Commit-
tee. Importantly, the deployment was viewed positively by
team members who all stated they would volunteer again,
which allows the development of an experienced cohort
of team members.
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